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MY PROF.

L.

LfeVV-BRUHL.

order to characterise Voltaire,
IN pedists,
from the point of view

Rousseau, and the Encycloof philosophy,

the

Germans

They

call them philosophers
They consider them quite as desirous
of spreading their doctrines among the public as of testing them
thoroughly.
But was there not one among them, or very near

often use a rather significant phrase.

/ur

die Welt, popularisers.

them, with whom the speculative interest stood foremost, a philosopher without any qualification and in the strictest sense of the
word, a thinker, in fact, who joined together into a system the body
of the philosophical ideas

which prevailed

in the latter half of the

eighteenth century?

This demand was met by Abb6 de Condillac.
He was, as he
has been called, the ''philosophers' philosopher." Being loved
and admired by most of them, he was for some time a contributor
to

the Encyclopc'die.

Duke

He made

a long stay in Italy, as tutor to

Parma, and then returned to France and
lived peacefully in the country, apart from literary and philosophical quarrels.
He never appeared at the French Academy except
on the day when he made his inaugural address. Yet he was perthe son of the

of

sonally acquainted with nearly

all

the distinguished

men

of the

and the continual succession of his published works did not
permit the public to forget him. These works were numerous and
bulky, from the Essai sur rOrigine des Connaissances Hiimaines
(1746), in which many of the ideas which he was to develop later
on were already sketched, down to the Langue des Calculs, which
did not appear until after his death.
He touched not only upon

time,
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every phase of philosophy proper, but also upon pedagogy, gram-

mar, history, political economy and social science, the most original portion of all this considerable body of work being that on the
theory of knowledge.
Condillac proposed studying the

human mind,

physician, but as a psychologist and a logician

;

not as a meta-

not in order to dis-

cover the nature of it, but to understand its operations. He wished
to observe the art with which they are combined, and how we are
to

manage them

in

order to acquire as

capable of receiving

;

much

intelligence as

we

are

and, therefore, he wished to trace back the

origin of our ideas, to discover their birth, to follow

them as

far

them by nature, and in this way to " determine the
extent and boundaries of our knowledge and to renovate the human
as the limits set

understanding altogether."
Condillac's leading idea therefore

not from

Locke

only.

is

derived from Locke, but

Hostile as he was to innate ideas and Car-

tesian metaphysics, there

is in

him

sian spirit.

Locke had inquired

human mind

;

clearly

something

of the Carte-

chiefly into the contents of the

Condillac endeavored to construct a system.

He

sought an "unassailable first principle, sufficient to explain all the
He sought it, it is true, in the primitive data of the senses,
rest."

whereas Descartes had found it in the intuition of thought; but
the opposition between their doctrines does not exclude a certain
analogy in their conceptions of the proper method.
Condillac never concealed his indebtedness to Locke, but his
In his first
estimate of the philosophy of his predecessor varied.
work he seems to follow him faithfully and to recognise, as Locke
sensation and reflexion.
Later on,
did, two sources to our ideas
when more thoroughly master of his own thought, he asserted sen:

sation to be the only source of our ideas.

He

considers Locke to

enough. Locke did not
realise how indispensable it is that we should learn how to feel, see,
hear, etc. All the faculties of the soul he thought to be innate qualities, and he did not suspect that they might possibly originate in
sensation itself.
He thought that we naturally make use of our
senses by a sort of instinct. Most of the judgments which are mingled with our sensations escaped him. In one word, it was in the
very name of empiricism that Condillac criticised Locke's empiri
It is not sufficient to reduce the whole of our knowledge to
cism.
sentient knowledge.
We must show how this sentient knowledge
is produced, resolve it into its elements, and show how these elements can account for every form of activity in the human soul.

have erred

in not carrying the analysis far

{(^NIIIT.I.AC.
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Let then our starting-point be sensation, isolated by analysis
and separated or at least Condillac thought it so from all judgments mingled with it. This sensation does not bring us out of
ourselves.
It merely consists in a modification of consciousness
which may be keen or weak, pleasurable or painful but it teaches
us nothing of what is outside ourselves, or even whether anything
exists outside ourselves.
This would be true as regards all our
sensations, if we had not touch. The sensations of touch have the

—

—

;

singular property of suggesting to us the idea of objects distinct

They

same time feelings and ideas:
feelings in their relation to the soul which they modif}', ideas in
their connexion with some outward thing.
Being accustomed to
from ourselves.

ascribe

we

fall

are at the

the sensations of the sense of touch to external objects,

all

Thus our sensations

into like habits with our other senses.

become objective; they appear
the state of the ego,

no longer as modifications of
but as qualities of bodies around us.
They
to us

have become ideas.
Let us now suppose a sensation more vivid than others to
force itself upon our consciousness so powerfully as to throw all
others, at least temporarily, into the shade
this exclusive sensawill
what
we
call
attention.
tion
be
But attention may just as well
directed
to
sensation,
which
be
a past
recurs again to the mind, a-;
to a present sensation.
Memory is therefore nothing but a trans
formed sensation. We are thus capable of a twofold kind of attention, exercised on the one hand by memory, on the other by the
present sensation.
Once given a twofold kind of attention, and
there results comparison; for, attending to two ideas and comparNow, we cannot compare
ing them are one and the same thing.
them without perceiving some difference or resemblance between
them. To perceive such relations is to perform an act of judgment. Thus does sensation, as it undergoes transformations, become successively attention, memory, comparison, and judgment.
Having reached this point we have explained the whole of human
understanding, which is, in fact, nothing but a collection or com:

bination of the operations of the soul.

By

looking upon sensations as representative

we have

ob-

our ideas and the faculties of our understanding
Now if we consider them with regard to their
issue from them.
served that

all

pleasurable or painful character,

we

the operations usually ascribed to the

shall
will.

behold the birth of all
Condillac lays it down

as a principle that there are no neutral sensations, but that each of

them gives us

either pleasure or pain,

and makes us inclined

to
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continue

it

or to escape

it.

Were

it

not for this property of our

—

would not be aroused, attention
and memory, and therefore understanding, would be left undevelBut nature has made us very sensible of the relative charoped.
sensations, intellectual activity

acter of the sensations that affect us.

We cannot be uncomfortable,

we have been before, without comparing
our present state with the states we have formerly been in and
this comparison makes us feel some uneasiness, or disquiet, and as
soon as there is added to this the idea of the object we think likely

or less comfortable than

;

to contribute to our happiness, the action of our faculties is deter-

mined in the direction of this object. This is what we call desire.
But from desire spring passions: love, hatred, hope, fear, volition.
Again,

all

these are but transformed sensations.

In order to illustrate his theory, Condillac, in his Traite des

had recourse to the celebrated fiction of an animated
statue, shaped internally like ourselves, in which he awakens the
senses in succession, beginning with smell and ending with touch.
Next we see the faculties of the soul springing one after another

Sefisations,

from the progressive transformations of sensation. Similar fictions
are to be found in Diderot and Buffon, which is sufficient to prove
that they suited the taste of their contemporaries and answered
their idea of the development of the mind.
To-day, on the contrary, we are chifly struck by the artificial and arbitrary character
of such a supposition.
We see in it an involuntary confession of
the fact that his theory of knowledge proceeds in a purely abstract
way.
Yet it would be unfair to condemn their doctrine summarily on
that account.
It is with Condillac as with many other French philosophers of his time, between whose minds and his there was evident affinity.
The solutions he unhesitatingly proposes are hasty
and often rash the problems he sets and the general method he
;

indicates for their solution are highly interesting.

In his theory of

transformed sensation, Condillac seeks to account for the evolution
of the human mind by starting from an irreducible "first fact."
As Buffon tried to explain the genesis of our solar system, as Rousseau sought afterwards to explain the genesis of society, Condillac
endeavors to trace back the genesis of the faculties of the human
mind. On the way he notices many interesting psychological

He shows

the part played by the association of ideas, which
causes us to look upon notions that are really acquired and complex as being natural and simple he sees that the association of

facts.

;

ideas

is

a particular case of habit.

And

thus the task of the phi-
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losopher, according to Condillac, consists chifly in dissociating,

by means

elements which habit has joined together
so closely that we can no longer see where they are welded toof analysis, the

gether.

memory

Analysis, therefore, does not stop where reflexion and

can separate or resolve no further. It is true, we have a tendency
to believe that part of our knowledge is born with us.
But this is
because we can remember a time when we did not know a given
thing only in case we can remember having learned it and, in
order to be conscious of learning we must know something already.
How then could we remember having learned to see, hear, or
touch? And yet it is certain that we have learned these things.
Consequently, we are driven to suppose that to be innate the acAll the rest
quisition of which we cannot otherwise account for.
is the product of experience.
For instance, if some faculty hap;

pens

to

be perfected (as the judgment of distance by sight),

therefore acquired;

it

was

reach of our memory, a

in its beginning, at a

first

From

We

is

only a

improvement upon some

first habit,

as habit

is

is

time beyond the
earlier state.

Condillac applied to psychology Pascal's well-known saying
ture itself

it

:

"Na-

a second nature."

these principles naturally follows the theor}' of instinct.

can distinguish two "selves"

in

every

man:

the self of habit

and the self of reflexion.
"The self of reflexion is its own master,
and is conscious of its own operations while performing them. It
endeavors to know or reach the objects which it has in view, and
which it may give up for other objects when it pleases. The "self
of habit " acts in a reflex way, so to speak, without the intervenIt touches, it sees, and it dition of consciousness being needed.
If
rects the animal faculties
it guides and preserves the body.
we suppress in a grown-up man the "self of reflexion," the "self
of habit" which remains suffices for such needs as are absolutely
;

necessary for the preservation of the animal.
but habit minus reflexion.

Instinct

is

nothing

But, Condillac adds immediately after,

by reflecting that beasts acquire it. As they have but few
wants, a time soon comes when they have done all that reflexion
can teach them. They daily repeat the same actions, and their
it is

habits

become automatic.

Yet does not instinct often appear

—

It

does, says Condillac, but

it is

to

be innate and hereditary

not so; for

we

find

it

?

subject to

improvement; now, whatever is subject to improvement is acquired.
All these consequences are most logically inferred from
Therefore he had a right to answer
Condillac's own principles.
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those

who reproached him with having drawn

his inspiration

the celebrated passage in which Buffon represents
to life

and admiring nature around him:

from

man awakening

"Monsieur de Buffon

supposes his imaginary man to possess in the beginning habits
which he ought to have had him acquire." To treat as acquired
habits faculties which appear to be most inherent in our nature, is
We all know how it prospered in the
Condillac's favorite maxim.
present century. It was one of the ruling principles of psycholog}',
as long as the philosophy of association was in favor, in England
as well as in France.
The sum of our reflexions over and above our habits constiBut language is necessary for the development
tutes our reason.
Were our thought limited to the representation of
of reason.
individual and concrete objects and unable to form abstract and
general ideas, it would remain forever in a rudimentary state.
Now such ideas are simply denominations and designations of
classes.
For instance, the idea of "animal" connotes characteristics common to man, the lion, the horse, and the totality of animals, and these characteristics only.
This idea I can fix only with
the help of the word which expresses it. We see therefore how indispensable words are to us.
But for them, there would be no abstract ideas.
Had we no abstract ideas, we should liave neither
genera nor species, and had we neither genera nor species, we
could not reason upon anything.
To speak, to reason, to form
general or abstract ideas, are at bottom one and the same thing.
Therefore, to communicate thought is not the only function of
language.
Whenever man thinks, even though he should not express his thought outwardly, he speaks. This has been called "inward language." The "first advantage " of language, according
to Condillac, is to separate thought into its elements by means of
a series of signs which successively represent the same. Whenever
I reason, all the ideas which constitute this reasoning are present
in

my mind

at once.

reasoning or to bring

which
It

is

tiiese

I

it

should not be able either
to a close

if

the series of

composed were not grasped

upon the
judgments of

to enter

my

mind.
not, therefore, by speaking that I judge and reason, and
operations of the mind necessarily precede discourse.
But
it is

discourse

is

a real analysis

all

together by

which resolves these complex opera-

and separates their successive stages. It leads the mind
from one thought to another, and from one discovery to another.
The more limited the faculty of thinking is in one who does not

tions

analyse his

own thoughts, and who,

in

consequence, does not ob-
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1,

serve

all

must
thoughts and observes even

that he does while thinking, the further this faculty

reach in one

who does

analyse his

their minutest details.

Consequently, "the art of reasoning is equivalent to the art of
speaking." In this sense well-constructed language is akin to wellconstructed science.

misuse

of

Nearly

our language.

we mistake

If

all

we

our errors originate in defects or

treat abstractions as realities, that

what

merely the
designation of an assemblage of qualities, is not that a misuse of
language? How often do we make use of words before we have
determined their meaning, and even without having felt the need
Such confusion in language necessarily implies
of determining it
confusion in thought. Error thus begets error, and language lends
is,

if

for a thing

actually existing

is

!

itself

no

systems than to true analysis.
then but one way of restoring order to the faculty

less easily to false

There

is

thinking, and that
to the origin of

Bacon

says, to

is

to forget

Error

is

that

we have

learned, to return

our ideas, to follow them as they develop, and, as

make over

to nature," is Condillac's

seau.

all

of

our

own

the

human

motto, as
doing.

understanding.

it

We

was

"Go

also to be that of

back
Rous-

think and speak erron;:ousl}',

and therefore we blunder; but we have only ourselves to blame.
The spirit of the rising generation is modelled after that of the preceding one, and erroneous systems are handed down together with
Such are the effects of
the languages which are their vehicles.
bad education, and education is bad only inasmuch as it is contrary to nature. "Nature has begun all things, and always aright:
this truth cannot be repeated too often."
We imagine that languages would be more perfect if they were
the work of philosophers, which is a serious mistake.
The languages of the sciences (algebra excepted) have no advantage over
According to Condillac, the earliest vulgar lanother languages.
guages must have been the best fitted for reasoning. The development of the ideas and faculties of the soul must have been perceptible in these languages, in which the first acceptation of each
word was still known, and in which analogy supplied all the others.
They were transparent things, so to speak, through which one
could watch the progress of the composition of thought.
Their
syntax was crystallised logic, and the science of the mind thus
spontaneously revealed itself in the structure of language. " Sound
metaphysics began before languages, and they owe to it their best
qualities. But this metaphysics was then not so much a science as
an instinct.
It was nature guiding men without their knowing it.
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and metaphysics became a science only
sound."
*

*

after

it

had ceased

to

be

*

There is therefore, according to Condillac, a natural method
which is the soul of language and science. If we followed it propThis method he calls
erly, it would lead us infallibly to truth.
"analysis." In his first work, he contented himself with saying
that analysis consists merely in combining and separating our ideas
in order to make different comparisons and thus to discover their
mutual relation and the new ideas to which they may give rise.
This analysis is "the secret of discoveries" because it always takes
" It consists," he says again, "in
us back to the origin of things.
tracing our ideas back to their origin, and in studying their development."
We see even by these definitions, that in Condillac's analysis
thought is not opposed to synthesis as decomposition is to compo
sition.
there is no reasoning
It comprehends both processes
which is not a succession of compositions and decompositions, and
the two operations are inseparable.
Yet the distinction between
analysis and synthesis subsists in Condillac, but in a special sense.
To proceed analytically, in his view, is to start from the simple,
the primitive, and the particular, proceeding with the help of
observation and experience, and reproducing the "development"
To proceed synthetically is to start from general and
of things.
abstract principles, aiming thence to deduce the particular and the
concrete,
an ambitious and faulty method which has too often led
;

—

metaphysicians astray.
If

our minds were powerful enough to perceive distinctly, at

one glance, a collection of objects or all the qualities of an object
and the connexions between these, we should have no need of
analysis.
Our knowledge would be intuitive and perfect from the
But it is not so we first have collective impressions, and in
first.
;

order to transform

these into knowledge

we must decompose

them. We therefore consider one after another the objects which
form part of a whole, and compare them in order to judge of their
mutual connexion. When we have thus become acquainted with
their respective positions, we observe in succession all those that
fill the intervals
we compare each of them with the nearest principal object and thus we determine its position.
In this way we
make out all the objects, the form and situation of which we have
discovered, and take them all in at one glance. The order assigned
to them in our mind is no longer successive, it has become simul;
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the order in which the objects really are situated,

It is

and we perceive them

once distinctly whence this specific
definition of analysis: "To analyze is simply to observe in successive order the qualities of an object, in order to assign to them in
the mind the simiiltaiieous order m which they exist."
But there are many ways of conceiving this successive order
that leads to a view, both simultaneous and distinct, of the relations between objects
can it be said that any one of these many
is the pre-eminently analytical order?
"The whole difficulty,"
says Condillac, " consists in finding how to begin in order to apprehend ideas in their most essential connexion with one another.
I assert that the only combination by which this is to be found is
the one which is in accordance with the very genesis of things.
We must start from the first idea which must have produced all
all at

;

;

The analytical order is the genetic order. If we knew a
sufficient number of facts, and had studied them closely enough,
systems would in some sort be self made, as facts would group
themselves of their own accord in such an order as to explain one
others."

another in succession.
there

is a first fact,

We

which

is

should then find that in every system
the beginning of it, and which for this

reason might be called the principle, for principle and beginning
are two words which have originally the

same meaning. Any system

which does not thus exactly reproduce the order of the evolution
and composition of facts, any system resting on general and abstract principles is arbitrary, and consequently false.
The logical
order of science coincides with the order in which phenomena are
produced in the course of time. In one word, in this empirical
conception of analysis the mind
to things.
of the

It is

mind
and

in things that

is

methodically

order

is

made subordinate

inherent, and the function

consists in reflecting back this order as faithfully as

Bacon's expression, a perfect mirror.
The stumbling-block to empiricism of this kind is generally to
be found in mathematics and metaphysics.
As regards mathematics, Condillac got out of the difficulty by reducing every demonstration to a succession of equivalent propositions "the identity of
which is obvious," and is more easily perceived when we use algebraical signs. Nor was metaphysics embarrassing to Condillac, no
doubt because he took but little care to make it fit in with the rest
of his system.
He proves dogmatically the existence of God from
the necessity of a first cause and from the existence of final causes.
We again meet in him the argument of the watch and the watchmaker, which Voltaire thought decisive. Without knowing the
possible,

in being, to use
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essence of the soul and of the body, Condillac knows that they are

two distinct substances.
"The body may be defined as an extended substance, and the soul as a sentient substance.
It is sufficient to consider entension and sensation as two incompatible properties, to be convinced that the substance of the soul and that of
the body are too widely different substances. Locke was wrong in
declaring that it will perhaps be forever impossible for us to know
whether God has not endowed some heap of matter shaped in a
certain way with the faculty of thinking.
For the subject that
must
thinks
be one. Now a heap of matter is not one it is a multiThe soul thus being a different substance from the bod}',
tude.
we cannot understand how the latter would act upon it. The body
can be only an occasional cause. We must therefore acknowledge
that the senses are but the occasional source of our knowledge.
Free access is thus left for idealism.
There is no reason why we should question Condillac's sincerbut the very fact of
ity as regards his spiritualistic metaphysics
its occupying so small a place in his system, and being so closely
connected with it, is characteristic. It means that psychology was
beginning to live an independent life and trying to rely solely on
Locke had shown the way Condilobservation and experience.
lac advanced farther. True, his solutions are still far from perfect.
He gives bad definitions of the terms he uses, and commentators
in our days are not of one mind as to what he understands by
" sensation," "perception," and "nature." No doubt, when he
tries to analyze facts, to discover their origin, and to trace back
their genesis, he most often construes them with the aid of factors
in themselves very complex. Nevertheless he has a precise concep
tion of empirical psychology, and attempts to study the especial
share of each of the senses in our knowledge, to analyze habit and

—

;

;

;

instinct, to define the function of the association of ideas, and, in

short, to discover the genesis of psychological

phenomena.

All

these points were to be taken up again later on, in accordance with
a

more prudent and

safer

method

;

but at

last

the questions had

been raised, and often with remarkable clearness and pertinency,
so that the influence of Condillac upon French thought was longlived and persistent, and it would not be impossible to find traces
of it in what is taught today in our schools.

